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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38366 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLEN 
JOHN MEIENHOFER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
Date: 2/3/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCSIMMSM 
Time: 03:50 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 4 Case: CR-MD-2009-0007676 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Defendant: Voss, Joseph A Jr 
State of Idaho vs. Joseph A Voss Jr 
Date Code User Judge 
4/29/2009 NCRM TCWADAMC New Case Filed - Misdemeanor Magistrate Court Clerk 
PROS TCWADAMC Prosecutor assigned Boise City Prosecutor- Mc1gistrate Court Clerk 
Generic 
5/5/2009 ORPD TCSCHWMA Defendant: Voss, Joseph August Jr Order Magistrate Court Clerk 
Appointing Public Defender Public defender Ada 
County Public Defender 
CHGA TCSCHWMA Judge Change: Adminsitrative Michael Oths 
HRSC TCSCHWMA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Michael Oths 
07/13/2009 10:15 AM) 
HRSC TCSCHWMA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/06/2009 08:30 Michael Oths 
AM) 
ORPD TCSCHWMA Order Appointing Public Defender Michael Oths 
5/20/2009 RSDS TCBULCEM State/City Response to Discovery Michael Oths 
RODS TCBULCEM State/City Request for Discovery Michael Oths 
5/21/2009 RODD TCRAMISA Defendant's Request for Discovery Michael Oths 
7/13/2009 HRHD TCMCCUKM Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Michael Oths 
07/13/2009 10:15 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC TCMCCUKM Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress Michael Oths 
09/09/2009 03:30 PM) 
TCPACKCF Notice Of Hearing Michael Oths 
NOCA TCBULCEM Notice Of Change Of Address Michael Oths 
7/14/2009 MOTN TCRAMISA Motion to Suppress Evidence Michael Oths 
9/8/2009 MISC TCBULCEM Points and Authorities in support of motion to Michael Oths 
suppress evidence 
9/9/2009 HRHD TCMCCUKM Hearing result for Motion to Suppress held on Michael Oths 
09/09/2009 03:30 PM: Hearing Held 
9/16/2009 ORDR TCMCCUKM Order RE: Defendant's Motion to Suppress Michael Oths 
Evidence---denied 
HRSC TCMCCUKM Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/28/2009 08:30 Michael Oths 
AM) 
TCMCCUKM Notice Of Hearing Michael Oths 
9/18/2009 BAAT PDPRECJR ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) Anita M.E. Moore, 
5885 removed. PD OTHS #24 assigned. 
BAAT PDPRECJR ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) PD OTHS #24 
removed. Brian Marx, 7694 assigned. 
10/28/2009 ORDR TCCHENKH Order for Conditional Plea of Guilty Michael Oths 
HRHD TCCHEI\IKH Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 10/28/2009 Michael Oths 
08:30 AM: Hearing Held 
MOTN TCCHENKH Motion and Order for Stay of Execution of Michael Oths 
Sentence and Pending Appeal 
MISC TCCHENKH S/O for SH Michael Oths 
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Date: 2/3/2011 
Time: 03:50 PM 
Page 2 of 4 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-MD-2009-0007676 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Defendant: Voss, Joseph A Jr 
User: CCSIMMSM 
State of Idaho vs. Joseph A Voss Jr 
Date Code User Judge 
10/28/2009 HRSC TCCHENKH Hearing Scheduled (Special Sentencing Michael Oths 
01/04/2010 01 :30 PM) 
TCURQUAM Notice Of Hearing Michael Oths 
MISC TCURQUAM Change of Address Michael Oths 
10/29/2009 TCGARDKM Notice Of Hearing Michael Oths 
1/4/2010 PLEA TCGARDKM A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (I37-2734(A) Michael Oths 
Drug Paraphernalia Possession of) 
FIGT TCGARDKM Finding of Guilty (I37-2734(A) Drug Paraphernalia Michael Oths 
Possession of) 
JAIL TCGARDKM Sentenced to Jail or Detention (I37-2734(A) Drug Michael Oths 
Paraphernalia Possession of) Confinement terms: 
Jail: 90 days. Suspended jail: 87 days. Work 
release. 
PROB TCGARDKM Probation Ordered (I37-2734(A) Drug Michael Oths 
Paraphernalia Possession of) Probation term: 1 
year O months O days. (Misdemeanor 
Unsupervised) 
SNPF TCGARDKM Sentenced To Pay Fine 235.50 charge: Michael Oths 
I37-2734(A) Drug Paraphernalia Possession of 
PLEA TCGARDKM A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (118-3302 Michael Oths 
Weapon-Carry Concealed Weapon Without A 
License) 
FIGT TCGARDKM Finding of Guilty (118-3302 Weapon-Carry Michael Oths 
Concealed Weapon Without A License) 
JAIL TCGARDKM Sentenced to Jail or Detention (118-3302 Michael Oths 
Weapon-Carry Concealed Weapon Without A 
License) Confinement terms: Jail: 30 days. 
Suspended jail: 30 days. 
PROB TCGARDKM Probation Ordered (118-3302 Weapon-Carry Michael Oths 
Concealed Weapon Without A License) Probation 
term: 1 year O months O days. (Misdemeanor 
Unsupervised) 
STAT TCGARDKM STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Michael Oths 
SNPF TCGARDKM Sentenced To Pay Fine 175.50 charge: 118-3302 Michael Oths 
Weapon-Carry Concealed Weapon Without A 
License 
HRHD TCGARDKM Hearing result for Special Sentencing held on Michael Oths 
01/04/2010 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
ORDR TCGARDKM Order staying of execution of sentence pending Michael Oths 
appeal 
1/6/2010 APDC TCRAMISA Appeal Filed In District Court Michael Oths 
CAAP TCRAMISA Case Appealed: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
STAT TCRAMISA STATUS CHANGED: Reopened Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/7/2010 CHGA TCRAMISA Judge Change: Adminsitrative Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/11/2010 NOTC DCNIXONR Notice of Preparation of Appeal Transcript Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/13/2010 OGAP DCTYLENI Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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Date: 2/3/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCSIMMSM 
Time: 03:50 PM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 4 Case: CR-MD-2009-0007676 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Defendant: Voss, Joseph A Jr 
State of Idaho vs. Joseph A Voss Jr 
Date Code User Judge 
2/5/2010 NLT DCNIXONR Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
TRAN DCNIXONR Transcript Lodged Kathryn A. Sticklen 
2/9/2010 TRAN DCNIXONR Amended Notice of Preparation of Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Transcript 
2/12/2010 NLT DCNIXONR Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
TRAN DCNIXONR Transcript Lodged Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/2/2010 NOTC DCTYLENI Notice of Filing Transcript (1/4/10) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
TRAN DCTYLENI Transcript Filed (1/4/10) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/9/2010 NOTC DCTYLENI Notice of Filing Transcript on Appeal (9/9/09) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
TRAN DCTYLENI Transcript Filed (9/9/09) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
4/1/2010 MOTN TCRAMISA Motion and Stip to Extend Time to File Brief of Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Appellant 
AFFD TCRAMISA Affidavit of Anita Moore in Support of Motion to Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Extend Time to File Brief of Appellant 
4/13/2010 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Granting Extension of Time (Appellant's Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Brief due 5/11 /10) 
5/10/2010 MISC TCRAMISA Appellant's Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/3/2010 MISC TCPETEJS Respondent's Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/24/2010 MISC TCRAMISA Reply Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
7/1/2010 NOHG TCRAMISA Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC TCRAMISA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Kathryn A. Sticklen 
08/17/2010 02:30 PM) Oral Argument 
7/9/2010 NOCA TCRAMISA Notice Of Change Of Address Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/3/2010 STIP TCRAMISA Stipulation to Continue Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/5/2010 ORDR DCTYLENI Order to Continue Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/6/2010 NOHG TCPETEJS Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC TCPETEJS Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Kathryn A. Sticklen 
08/25/2010 02:30 PM) Oral Argument 
8/25/2010 HRVC TCHOCA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Kathryn A. Sticklen 
08/17/2010 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Oral 
Argument 
DCHH TCHOCA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Kathryn A. Sticklen 
08/25/2010 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Oral Argument/50 
9/20/2010 BMT TCNELSRA ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) Anita M.E. Moore, 
5885 removed. PD GARDUNIA #25 assigned. 
BMT TCNELSRA ATTORNEY REASSIGNED BY BATCH 
PROCESSING (batch process) PD GARDUNIA 
#25 removed. Elizabeth H Estess, 5646 assigned. 
11/2/2010 DEOP DCTYLENI Memorandum Decision and Order Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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Date: 2/3/2011 
Time: 03:50 PM 
Page 4 of 4 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-MD-2009-0007676 Current Judge: Kathryn A Sticklen 
Defendant: Voss, Joseph A Jr 
State of Idaho vs. Joseph A Voss Jr 
Date Code User 
11/17/2010 MOTN TCRAMISA Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in 
Support 
12/8/2010 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration 
12/14/2010 APSC CCLUNDMJ Appealed To The Supreme Court 
User: CCSIMMSM 
Judge 
Kathryn A Sticklen 
Kathryn A Sticklen 
Kathryn A Sticklen 
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f ~ , 4 
BOISE POLICE DEPT. ~I 
IDAHO llNIFORllt1 CITATION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE· 4JH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
• THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A~O_A __ 










~ Last Name 
FirstliJt;zh A 
~l Infraction Citation 
~isdemeanor Citation 
['l Accident Involved 
DR# 
~==~t~f ·. -
VIN # __ ---·· __ __ USDOT TK Census # 
LJ Operator D Class A D Class B D Class C D Class D D Other ______ _ 
~ J GVWR 26001 + D 16 + Persons D Placard Hazardous Materials IPUC# 
Home Address 
Business Address ~Af,d { ,,, { r[v a €NT . Ph# ns. 'JJ..'J..> . 
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY) HEREBY CERTIFIES AND SAYS: 
D DL DID /i1V I certify I have reasonable grounds, and believe the above-na 
DLorSS# ~---~ ___ ~_.,._..._ __ Sex: 
Height r / / Wt. 'j... l-0 _ Hair p/Lv. _ Eyes ~-IA.--"'--. DOB 
Veh Lie# L.,tu t{.). '.1 S-.-- -~ __ _ State _ __ Yr. of :hicle _7-c ~ :L__ 
Make ___ _ __ 4J' I) 1 . _ _ Model j' -idi,,..2 __ Color Li. e tt. <; ~ ···-
Did commit the toitow:ng act(s) on yd- 0 q . 20 O 9 at / / O b ~0ock -A- M. 
Vio. #1 _J7 llf E Gia N ct___~ f&r,.;d-, ~ 4A_ Tl·J?Jil/1 
v. io. #2 2._{7f;J; ~ t7n1a,/eD i,.,,1..(L ~o,.J - J/·.l"f_P7:, __ _g _ _____ _1l/~k__ ·-- r _ Code::iect,on 
Location 
Hwy. ' Mp. __ -=--- ADA County, Idaho. 
'£.P~- u'/tMU) __s:'.$.- --~*-;yl'_~;~iEPT 
Df~ ~ Office. r/Party/) ·Serl;J.I #;Address ?" 
_2".· l· /) / -~I>/,! fj<.'[.r ,4 f ff, [{).,JC 1P1« ( l [ 'f /). 3L__~_ 
Date Witnessing Officer Serial #,Address Dept. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court ot the 
, Idaho, 
.'t!D~, 
District Court of ADA County, BOISE 
located at 200 W. FRONT ST. on or after Y, J tl 
but on or before £. 7 , 20 0 .i. at 8 A.M.-4o'clock .f_M. 
~J 
I a~owl~e rE111lipt of this su~ns and I promise to appear at the time indicated. 
t) -;O C'> / /.;/t v-e,,p 
b' i:-;, en ~ o ndant's Signature 
~ a, ~ 
I heri!by ce1}!j se"ffle up '/;/ I ,20 o <J -,~~~----~ 
~1 0 
NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions. 
/V\1 IDT l'.r'li:JV VIOLATION #1 q - / fJ f {:J 
! 
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1m. ______ _ 
AJl. _____ rn_,-.E__~'.1 ~g_3= 
IN THE DIST,w'T COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL .....-TRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA MAY C 5 ?~G9 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
) STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
J. DAVID N/\VAnRO, Cl13rl'. 
) By M SCHW,11.RT7 
) f)fOIJTV 
) Case No: CR-MD-2009-0007676 
) Joseph August Voss Jr 
2128 Lakeridge Place 
Boise, ID 83706 
) NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENDER 
) AND SETTING CASE FOR HEARING 
) 
~ D Ada ~ Boise D Garden City D Meridian Defendant. 
---------------------
TO: Ada County Public Defender 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you are appointed to represent the defendant in this cause, or in the District 
Court until relieved by court order. The case is continued for: 
Pretrial Conference Monday, July 13, 2009 10: 15 AM 






BONDAMOUN~ ____ _ The Defendant is: D In Custody D Released on Bail D ROR 
TO: The above named defendant 
IT HAS BEEN ORDERED BY THIS COURT that the defendant is to contact the Ada County Public Defender's 
Office at 200 W. Front Street, Room 1107, Boise, Idaho 83702. Telephone: (208) 287-7400. If the defendant is unable to 
post bond and obtain his/her release from jail, that the proper authorities allow the defendant to make a phone call to the 
Ada County Public Defender. 
IT HAS BEEN FURTHER ORDERED: That the parties, prior to the pre-trial conference, complete and comply 
with Rule 16 I.C.R. and THAT THE DEFENDANT BE PERSONALLY PRESENT AT BOTH THE PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE AND/ OR THE JURY TRIAL: FAILURE TO APPEAR AT EITHER THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE OR 
THE JURY TRIAL WILL RESULT IN A BENCH WARRANT FOR THE DEF: NDANT'S ARREST. 
Dated : 5/5/2009 
I hereby certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Tuesday, May 05, 2009. 
Defendant: Mailed ~:d DeliveredJL- Si~naturertef"'- ~--
'4AAA.., {)!/. Phone { t- -Z. s · 21 Z c 
Clerk/ da e 
Prosecutor: Interdepartmental Mail 'i-
Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail 't 
NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENDER TCSCHWMA 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Kelley K. Fleming 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 6560 
-
NO. ___ FliLEiv'~f----
A.M FILED' = -----,PM._-,. ____ _ 
MAY 2 D 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO Cl 
B EA ' erk Y IN BULCHER 
DEPUTY 
I~ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CR-MD-2009-0007676 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Kelley K. Fleming, Assistant City 
Attorney, and submits the following Response to Request for Discovery: 
The State has complied with such request by furnishing the following information, 
evidence and materials: 
/ 
1. Copies of: 
Boise Police Department General Report DR# 909-128 
Boise Police Department Supplemental Report DR# 909-128 
Boise Police Department Idaho Uniform Citation 
Case Status Report DR# 909-128 
Ada County Sheriff/Boise Police Property Invoice(s) 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 1 mh 
000009
-
2. Defendant advised of existence and allowed access to when available (for audio or 
video tapes, see paragraph #6): 
Audio Tape and/or Digital Audio Recording(s) 
3. Results of examination and tests: 
NIA 
4. The State intends to call as witnesses: 
Officer Ted M. Arnold Ada #532, Boise Police Department, 333 N Sailfish Pl, Boise, 
ID 83709, (208) 577-3000 
Dylan M. Pierce, 454 N Elwood Dr, Boise, ID 83704, no phone number available 
David Roberts, Timberline High School, 701 E Boise Ave, Boise, ID 83706, 854~ 
6238 
Leslie McChristy, Timberline High School 
701 E Boise Ave, Boise, ID 83706, 854-6293 
Austin R. Carter, 1616 S Broadway Ave, Boise, ID 83706, 860-0226 
Nathan R. Pierce, 454 W. Elwood Drive, Boise, ID 83706, (208) 385-9640 
And any other individuals identified in the discovery materials. 
5. There may be other relevant information or documents on this case contained in the 
Court file. 
6. If the citation and/or police report reflect the existence of audio file(s), video files, 
videotape(s), and/or compact disc(s), please email a request to BCAO@cityofboise.org 
including the case number and the name of the defendant OR contact the legal 
secretary for the undersigned to make arrangements to do one of the following: 
a) Have the digital audio tape file sent to the email address on file for your 
office; 
b) Listen and/or view the audiotape, videotape, and/or CD at the Boise City 
Attorney's office; 
c) Make a copy of the audio file, video file or compact disc at our office using 
our high-speed dubbing machine; 
d) Make a copy of the videotape at our office using our double-deck video · 
cassette recorder; 
e) Fill out a request form and provide a blank videotape to the office to have a 
copy available for pickup within three business days. 
DATED this ___jj_ day of May, 2009. 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Jj_ day of May, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Anita Marie Moore 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front Street, Room 1107 





RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 3 mh 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Kelley K. Fleming 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 6560 
"-I•·' 
'~0---- ~ 
c,1_.p~r\,l -\.i1JI__ ~'vl _ 
MAY 't. U 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By ERIN BULCHER 
DEPU1Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












TO: Anita Marie Moore: 
Case No. CR-MD-2009-0007676 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of the following information. evidence and 
materials: 
1. DOCUMENTS AND TANGIBLE OBJECTS -- Books, papers, documents, 
photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, 
custody or control of the defendant, and which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at 
the trials. 
2. REPORTS OF EXAMINATION AND TESTS --Any results or reports of physical 
or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the 
particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which the 





defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared by a witness 
whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports relate to testimony of 
the witness. 
3. DEFENSE WITNESSES -- Names and addresses of any witnesses which the 
defendant intends to call at trial and a current curriculum vitae for any witness which the defense 
intends to utilize as an expert at trial. 
The undersigned further requests permission to inspect and copy said information, 
evidence and materials prior to the 27th day of May, 2009, at a time and place mutually 
agreeable to the parties hereto. 
FURTHER, please take notice that the undersigned prosecutor, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 19-519, demands the defendant to serve, within ten (10) days, upon the prosecutor, a 
written notice of defendant's intention to offer alibi. Such notice shall state the specific place or 
places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the 
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi. 
YOU ARE FURTHER notified of the requirement to disclose any additional witnesses 
promptly to the prosecutor named below as they become known to you. 
DATED this Jj_ day of May, 2009. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 2 mh 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Jj_ day of May, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Anita Marie Moore 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front Street, Room 1107 





REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 3 mh 
000014.,. ( ,_ •'•, -
'· . 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 MA'f 2 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff 
Case No. CR-MD-2009-0007676 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY vs. 
JOSEPH AUGUST VOSS JR, 
Defendant. 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff, and to BOISE CITY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned, pursuant to ICR 16, requests discovery 
and photocopies of the following information, evidence, and materials: 
1) All unredacted material or information within the prosecutor's possession or 
control, or which thereafter comes into his possession or control, which tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or tends to reduce the punishment thereof. ICR 
16( a). 
2) Any unredacted, relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, 
or copies thereof. within the possession, custody or control of the state. the 
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the 
exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of any relevant, oral statement 
made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer, 
prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney's agent; and the recorded 
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense 
charged. 
3) Any unredacted, written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the 
substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before 
or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person known by the co-
defendant to be a peace office or agent of the prosecuting attorney. 
4) Any prior criminal record of the defendant and co-defendant, if any. 
5) All on redacted documents and tangible objects as defined by ICR l 6(b )( 4) in the 
possession or control of the prosecutor, which are material to the defense, 
intended for use by the prosecutor or obtained from or belonging to the defendant 
or co-defendant. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY, Page 1 
000015
..._,. _, 
6) All reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or 
experiments within the possession, control, or knowledge of the prosecutor, the 
existence of which is known or is available to the prosecutor by the exercise of 
due diligence. 
7) A written list of the names, addresses, records of prior felony convictions, and 
written or recorded statements of all persons having knowledge of facts of the 
case known to the prosecutor and his agents or any official involved in the 
investigatory process of the case. 
8) A written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce 
pursuant to rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or 
hearing; including the witness' opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and 
the witness' qualifications. 
9) All reports or memoranda made by police officers or investigators in connection 
with the investigation or prosecution of the case, including what are commonly 
referred to as "ticket notes." 
10) Any writing or object that may be used to refresh the memory of all persons who 
may be called as witnesses, pursuant to IRE 612. 
11) Any and all audio and/or video recordings made hy law enforcement officials 
during the course of their investigation. 
12) Any evidence, documents, or witnesses that the state discovers or could discover 
with due diligence after complying with this request. 
The undersigned further requests written compliance within 14 days of service of the 
within instrument. 
DATED, Thursday, May 21, 2009. 
ANI M.E. MOORE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on Thursday, May 21, 2009, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
BOISE CITY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Counsel for the State of Idaho 
by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY, Page 2 
000016
__ , 
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE MINUTES 
Joseph August Voss Jr CR-MD-2oog..0007fi7fl DOB
Scneouled E,ent Pn,lriat Confen,nce Monday, .l.,l-~3. 2009 10 15 AM 
~1Jage Michael Oths. Ci erk: ~......,,/ interpreter:~----, 
Prosecuting Agency: _ AC ¥ BC _ GC _ MC Pros: ,..~--
~ Attorney: y'.LJ)~--
• 1 137-.2734(A) Drug Paraphernalia Possession of M 
• 2 118..;3302 ~eap~n-Carry C~ncealed W~apo~thout A License M 
--~-- ,.__;ase called Defendant: _:::=--_fr eessent __ Not Present 
Waived Rights __ PD Appointed 
In Custody 
Waived Attorney __ Advised of Rights 
__ Guilty Plea/ PV Admit 
::::and $ 
y,nChambecs 
NiG Plea __ Advise Subsequent Penalty 
ROR __ Pay i Stay __ Pa:;rnent Agreement 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJ..CT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A~'-----FiL~~---------
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Joseph August Voss Jr 
4180 Ticondesoga wy 











JUL 1 3 2009 
J OAVID NAVAR Rt.:, · Ii=--· 
'3y C. PACKE1: 
fJEPU"'• 
Case No: CR-IVID-2009-0007676 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
_______________ ) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion to Suppress Wednesday, September 09, 2009 03:30 PM 
Judge: Michael Oths 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the 
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date 
Monday, July 13, 2009. 
Defendant: 
Private Counsel: 
Anita M.E. Moore 
200 W Front St Rm 1107 
Boise ID 83702 
Mailed --
Signature __ Id _________ _ 
Phone ~~-----------
Hand Delivered __ Clerk Date ---- ----
Prosecutor: D Ada~ Boise D G. C. D Meridian Interdepartmental Mail £ Clerk f'1Yv1 Date 7d /-O 7~ 
Public Defender: Interdepartmental 1\/lail __ Clerk ____ Date ___ _ 
Other: _____________ Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ 
Dated: 7/13/2009 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Clerk ____ Date ___ _ 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Court 
By~, ~~Clerk 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 












Criminal No. CR-MD-2009-7676 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, JOSEPH AUGUST VOSS, JR., by and 
through his Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, ANITA MOORE, 
handling attorney, and hereby moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Amendments 4, 5 and 14 
of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, I.C.R. l 2(b )(3 ), 
and all relevant statutory and case law, for its Order to suppress a11 evidence seized in the instant 
case. This motion is made upon the grounds and for the reason that the evidence in this case was 
the fruit of a warrantless search that was conducted unlawfully and in violation of the 
aforementioned constitutional provisions. 
The Defendant above-named respectfully requests that this motion be set for hearing in 
order to adduce argument and/or testimony in support thereof. In addition, the defense will be 
filing a brief and/or points and authorities in support of this motion. 
DA TED, this J/Jllii day of July, 2009. ~--==----=__)=----· ,_."--_ 
ANITA M. E. MOORE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this ~1~· +-- day of July, 2009, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the: 
Boise City Attorney 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Criminal No. CR-MD-2009-7676 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
________________ ) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, JOSEPH AUGUST VOSS, JR., by and 
through his Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, ANITA MOORE, 
handling attorney, and hereby provides the Court with the following Points and Authorities in 
support of his Motion to Suppress. In this case, it is contended that the search of Mr. Voss' car 
by the police and the vice-principal of Timberline High School on the date of the alleged offense 
was unlawful. All of the fruits of the search, including evidence uncovered in the search, 
admissions and witness statements, should be suppressed. 
EXPECTED FACTS 
On April 8, 2009, David Roberts, then vice-principal of Timberline High School, 
received a complaint from an unknown pedestrian that Mr. Voss almost ran him down at an 
unknown location. When Mr. Roberts went to discuss the matter with Mr. Voss, he smelled 
smoke on Mr. Voss' person. Mr. Voss is 18 years old. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, 
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Based on the smell of smoke, Mr. Robe11s decided to search Mr. Voss' car, which was 
parked in the Timberline High parking lot. He solicited the aid of Officer Arnold of the Boise 
City Police in conducting the search. Also present for the search was a school security officer, 
who apparently did not actively participate in the search. Both Mr. Roberts and Officer Arnold 
went through Mr. Voss' car and discovered various items of contraband. During the search, as 
items were found, Mr. Voss made detailed admissions, giving the names of other individuals 
who were then questioned by Officer Arnold. 
Officer Arnold's account of the basis for the car search is inconsistent. On the one hand, 
Officer Arnold's audio contains a verbal note to the effect that the basis for the search was that 
Mr. Voss smelled of smoke, and that he admitted to contraband in his car; on the other hand, his 
police report gives as the only basis for the search the smell of smoke on Joseph Voss' person. It 
is not clear at this writing the point at which these alleged admissions were made, or what was 
meant by "contraband." As noted above, Mr. Voss did make admissions during the search. The 
police report also describes the search as "a reasonable suspicion school check of Voss' car," and 
characterizes the search as a "check" several times in the report, suggesting that the officer 
himself did not consider the search to be based on probable cause. No statement by Mr. Roberts 
has been provided in discovery. When contacted by defense counsel on September 3, 2009, Mr. 
Roberts, who no longer works at Timberline High School, stated that he had no independent 
recollection of the incident, and that he would need to review Timberline's files, to which he did 
not then have access. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
1. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable in the absence of a well-delineated exception 
to the warrant requirement. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660 (2007), citing 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, 
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Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 
2. An officer's warrantless entry of a vehicle to search it or to seize items within 1s 
presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches, 
unless the State shows that it falls within one of the narrowly-drawn exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. State v. Munoz, __ Idaho _, 2009 WL 764153 (Ct.App.2009), 
citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 
(1973) and State v. Gomez, 144 Idaho 865 (Ct.App.2007). Police may search a car 
without a warrant only if there is probable cause to believe that the car contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime. Id. 
3. Evidence obtained as the result of a Fourth Amendment violation must be suppressed. 
Munoz, supra, citing Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 
(1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); 
State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215 (1999). 
4. The Fourth Amendment applies in searches by school officials, albeit not as strictly as in 
the case of searches by police officers, because of the special authority of schools over 
students. Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009); Nett-· 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985). Under Safford and T.L.O., the 
search of a student by a school official as actually conducted must be reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Safford, 
129 S.Ct. at 2642; T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 733. The scope of such a search is permissible 
where it is "not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction." Id. 
5. Even if this search is viewed strictly as a search by a school official, it is unreasonable in 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, 
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view of the scope and manner of the search, the age of the student and the nature of the 
infraction. The suspicion that Mr. Voss was violating a school rule by smoking on 
campus is wholly unrelated to what he might have had in his car. The search for tobacco 
products in his car is even more problematic in view of the fact that he was 18 at the time 
of the search, and therefore could lawfully possess tobacco products. By the standards 
enunciated in Safford and TL.O., the search was excessively intrusive. 
6. However, the relaxed standards of Safford and T.L.O. should not apply in this case, 
since an officer of the Boise City Police Department took an active part in this 
search from its inception. Mere reasonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless 
vehicle search in this case. 
7. The smell of smoke on Mr. Voss' person does not give rise to probable cause to search 
his car. As previously noted, Mr. Voss was 18 years old at the time of the search, and 
therefore neither his possession nor his use of tobacco was against the law. 
8. An anonymous complaint that Mr. Voss was driving inattentively at an unknown time in 
an unknown location gives neither reasonable suspicion (which in this case would not 
justify the search) nor probable cause to search his car for contraband. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the search of Joseph Voss' car was unlawful, and all the 
evidence uncovered as a result of this search should be suppressed. 
DA TED, this ffl1__ day of September, 2 
) 
Attorney for Defendant 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this &~ day of September, 2009, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the: 
Boise City Attorney 
by fax and by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
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Plaintiff, 
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) CASE# CR-MD-2009-0007676 
) 
) ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S 




The above-captioned case is a two-count complaint, charging the Defendant with 
"Carrying a Concealed Weapon" and "Possession of Drug Paraphernalia" The alleged 
conduct occurred on April 8, 2009. 
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence in this case on July 14, 2009. The 
parties appeared for hearing on the motion on September 9, 2009, producing testimony 
and presenting argument. Anita Moore represented the Defendant; Jared Stubbs 
represented the City of Boise. The court thereafter took the matter under advisement, in 
order to consider the points and authorities cited by the parties. 
Findings of Fact 
1) On April 8, 2009, defendant was a student at Timberline High School ("THS"), in 
Boise. During the events in question he was eighteen years old. 
2) Defendant drove his car to school on that morning. Another driver called the 
school administration to complain about the Defendant's driving, on school property. 
3) David Roberts was Assistant Principal at THS at the time, and called Defendant to 
his office to discuss the driving complaint. Mr. Roberts determined that no disciplinary 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 1 
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action was necessary concerning the driving, but also smelled the odor of tobacco coming 
from the Defendant. 
4) THS has a strict policy against use or possession of tobacco products on school 
grounds, including in any vehicles driven onto campus by a student. Violation of that 
policy is not a criminal act, but is a violation of school policy, subjecting students to 
discipline. 
5) Defendant did not admit to tobacco use or possession on campus during his 
conversation with Mr. Roberts. 
6) Because Defendant is eighteen years old, he was legally permitted to use and 
possess tobacco products when not at school. 
7) Based on prior interactions with Defendant, Mr. Roberts suspected that Defendant 
possessed tobacco, either on his person or in his vehicle. 
8) Ted Arnold is a member of the Boise Police Department, assigned as a School 
Resource Officer at THS. Although Mr. Roberts decided to search Defendant's vehicle 
without consulting Officer Arnold, he did ask him (and another school official) to assist 
in the search of the vehicle. 
9) Mr. Roberts testified that he made it clear to Defendant that he would be searching 
his car, with or without his consent, but he did thereafter ask him for consent. In response 
to that request, Defendant opened his car door for the school officials and Officer Arnold. 
Both Mr. Roberts and Officer Arnold searched the vehicle, and found both the drug 
paraphernalia and concealed weapon that are at issue in this case. [It was not made clear 
whether any tobacco products were found]. 
1 O) Defendant now seeks to suppress the recovery of the items, claiming that the 
search was unconstitutional. 
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Conclusions of Law 
1) The analysis of this motion is the same, whether the search was conducted only by 
the assistant principal, or with the active assistance of the police officer. The U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed this question, directly, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 
(1985). 
In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated the Fourth 
Amendment, we are faced initially with the question whether that Amendment's 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted 
by public school officials. We hold that it does. 
It is now beyond dispute that "the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers." 
[ citations omitted]. Equally indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the rights of students against encroachment by public school 
officials: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Education not excepted. 
* * * * 
On reargument, however, the State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the 
Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to regulate only 
searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement officers; accordingly, 
although public school officials are concededly state agents for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable 
against them. 
* * * * 
In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, 
school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the 
parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
2) Unlike an ordinary warrantless search, requiring "probable cause" as a standard, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a lower standard for school searches. 
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the 
accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need 
of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does 
not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable 
cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. 
Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the 
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reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the 
reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider 
"whether the ... action was justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 
20 ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted "was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place," ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a 
teacher or other school official will "justified at its inception" when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will tum up evidence that the 
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a 
search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably 
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the 
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Id. at 469 U.S. 342-
343. 
3) The Supreme Court elaborated on the T.L.O. standard in a more recent case, by 
noting: 
The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate 
chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing. Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. 
Redding, U .S._(2009). 
4) The Court has also clarified that the scope of the search must be limited to the area 
that is capable of concealing the object of the search. Id. In other words, a search for a 
stolen car would not justify the search of a school locker. 
5) The Supreme Court has essentially ruled that the reasonableness of a school search 
wil I employ a balance between the scope of the circumstances justifying the inquiry with 
the degree of intrusion made. In Safford, the Court disapproved the degree of intrusion, 
because it involved a strip search of a thirteen year old girl, in a search for a relatively 
benign category of drugs (ibuprofen and naproxen). 1 
1 Safford was not a criminal case, but a civil § 1983 case. The court ultimately disallowed the civil suit, but took time 
to comment on the reasonableness of the search. 
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Discussion 
The TLO and Safford cases are clearly the most specific authority on the subject of school 
searches. 2 Neither party has identified any Idaho cases specifically directed to school 
searches, nor has the court found any such guidance. 
Applying the test set forth in TLO and reaffirmed in Safford, this court needs to engage in 
a two step analysis: 1) was the action was justified at its inception, and 2) was the search 
as actually conducted reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place? 
The inquity by Assistant Principal Roberts was justified in the inception. Tobacco 
products and use are prohibited on school property- a reasonable regulation, regardless 
of the age of the student. By smelling smoke on the Defendant's person, the school 
official was justified in making further inquiry to see if "smoke meant fire." 
The next level of inquiry is whether the search was reasonably related to the suspected 
offense. Using the language from Safford, was there a "moderate chance of finding 
evidence of wrongdoing?" In this case, based on the clear indication that Defendant had 
recently smoked tobacco, that he had a vehicle on campus, and that he had had prior 
issues at the school, I would agree that there was a "moderate" chance that his car 
contained tobacco. The degree of intrusion, in this case, was much less invasive than the 
strip search employed in Safford. I cannot conclude that he actually consented to the 
search, based on the clear indication from the assistant principal that the car would be 
searched, either way. At the same time, a search of his vehicle, after he opened the door 
to the searchers, cannot be considered to be an excessive intrusion. 
2 There is an interesting question, specifically applicable to the instant case, that remains unanswered from T.L. 0. 
and Safford. In Safford, the Supreme Court alternates between discussing the search in terms of criminal activity and 
school rules, which may or may not be the same thing. They are not the same thing in our case, because tobacco 
possession, by the 18 year-old Defendant, would not have been a crime. Ultimately, footnote 1 in Safford seems to 
analyze the search question in terms ofa school's power to enforce its own rules, so this court will employ the 
broader approach. 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 5 
000030
Finally, it appears that the Supreme Court has taken a diametrically different approach to 
school searches than it has to searches of ordinary citizens. In the latter case, the 
individual rights of the person-to-be-searched are paramount, and the state needs to 
justify exceptions to those rights. In school searches, the power of the school to maintain 
order is given precedence, and will only be disturbed if there has been an abuse of that 
authority. I see no such abuse in this case. 
Order 
Based on the foregoing, it is my conclusion that the search was not violative of 
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. For those reasons, the motion to suppress is 
denied. The clerk is instructed to set the matter for trial. 
DATED this A!Jay of ~.,_(;...2-.... 
_I - ··---
, 2009 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
,' µ, 11-..1,\---:,:~----
~d~=m-·\..;....\_F_IL~t. ___ _ 
i ,.-.·~ 
u~, I :~ t! 2009 
, DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
9v K H CHENEY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 












Criminal No. CR-MD-2009-7676 
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, JOSEPH AUGUST VOSS, JR., and, 
pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(2) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, hereby enters his plea of GUILTY to the 
charges herein, upon the condition that he reserves his right, on appeal from the judgment, to 
review of the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress filed and litigated herein, as well 
as his right to withdra],i.plea of guilty in the event he prevails on appeal. 
DATED this day of October, 2009. 
ANITA MOORE 
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT 
~THS 
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.l\D.", COUNTY MAGISTRATE MINUTES 
Joseph August Voss Jr CR-~.1 u-2cos-ucc- ,=,~ c 
i.:x1 Ev:.'nt Jury Trial 
Judge Michele! Oths 
• 1 127 2734(A) Drug Paraphernalia Possess1c:·, ot r,.1 
'.20C9 JS 30 Af\1 
Pros 
• 2 I 18-,3302 Weapor,-Carry C,)nc.::,ded VVc·apon v\·1thout A ;_,cen:,;a M 
:_,ss :::"lied Defe,,c,,,t _fyresent ',,,t Present 
c; Jiltv Plea • P\.' ,A,dm;t __ Advise S;osequent Pe1,a1:y 




___ . ~tr rn= =- ----. 
---------
SJ-\:_ 1/Y/:io10(!! {:3Dj(Y'y 
----- --------------- --- --------------------------------------------------------- -----
-----------
·--·---------------------------
Fir,;sn 1 Reieas2 Defendant ~~-------------------------
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
NO \DI'S mo A.M_. ___ P.M, ___ _ 
OCT 2 8 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By KH CHENEY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 












Criminal No. CR-MD-2009-7676 
MOTION FOR ST A Y OF EXECUTION 
OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, JOSEPH AUGUST VOSS, JR., and, 
pursuant to Rule 54.S(a) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, hereby moves this Court for its Order 
staying execution of the sentence pending appeal in the instant case. 
DATED this ff ctay of October, 200~----c_-, ) 
ANITA M-=o-=--=o:--=R=--=E=--~-===-----
A TTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ~-,lt,Utt/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this i!Elv day of October, 2009, I mailed- a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the: 
Boise City Attorney 
b;r depositing the sttme in the lntefdepttftfflen+ttl Mail. 
tMJ~. 
MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL, Page 2 
000035
---·'' 
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRArE MINUTES 
Joseph August Voss Jr CR-MD-2009-0007676 DOB:-
Scheduled Event: Special Sentencing Monday, January 04, 2010 01 :30 PM 
Judge: Michael Oths Clerk: \(ft Interpreter: ---+-+-..,,,......-----t----,---
Prosecuting Agency: _ AC ~ BC _ GC _ MC Pros: __,,"9f--->.---""-'""-""""""'~-----
®Attorney: 11--7---1-1--1~~_._.,.___~--
• 1 I37-2734{A) Drug Paraphernalia Possession of M 
• 2 118--3302 Weapon-Carry Concealed Weapon Without A License M 
lH./{tf:E_ Case Called Defendant~ Present Not Present __ In Custody 
~ Advised of Rights ~ Waived Rights ___ PD Appointed __ Waived Attorney 
,.,....... Guilty Plea / PV Adm~ N/G Plea re=- Advise Subsequent Penalty/'/ 0 mo~) 
Bond $_______ ROR __ Pay/ Stay ~ Paym~ f~reement '-" 
In Chambers PT Memo No Contact Order 
5:1JJ.An~~~~---=----~~~--=--~==-·, ~_:::=rt1tr:::::::-'-~==:!--
Finish Release Defendant 
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IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION 
·coURT DOCKET 
F1,e:i l1:1e ,1a1u b1 ,nail 
o,,.':;r,aa:1t appt1area - First appearance 
Entee,2d piea of ;,on;,ss,on or guiity 
. ~ 
!nlracticn: P1ea oi adm:ssio11 
Misdemeanor: I plead guilty to the offense: 
'~ Paid fixed penalty or fine (Delendanr's s,gnature) 
____ _ __ Sentenceo by court 
;.: , st·O Jf r,011,s entc;red pie"! of denial or 11ot guilty 
.- 111a: set for____ - Juy __ Jury Waived __ Jury NIA 
Ba,, 2Et in amount$ _________________ (misdemeanor only) 
Ccir:,n~ed until __________ _ 
',V:::.rra11t issued - Reasc,n ______________________ _ 
De:auli - IE11ied 10 appc:-·ar 0 11 infraction 
Gin:;r :1cuo11. 
rl·, -:-HE DISTc1ICT COURT OF THE __ 4TH ___ DISTRICT 
CF THE STATE OF iOAHO, COLJNTY OF ADA 
THI:: STATE OF IJ,\HO. P!a1nt,1i ) 
) JUDGEMENT (VIOLATION #1) 
.s. ) 
Case No . 
. :Jele11dant. 
The cere:1aarit having been iul1y ::1dvised o_f his const:tutional and statutory rights, inclua;ng his 
:,g!,t to be rc,;::,liserited by counsel, a11d the ct'efendarn hav;ng: 
322cc :idv:sed ol rigr:r to co:..,rt appointed cc:..nsel if indigent 
82.:n r(,presented b/ counsel _ 
® a,ve:1 co,m.;ol :k·0,~ a plea of adrn,ss.on or guilty 
~ 1:e 'JD a piea of oen,al or not guilty, and llas been 
_ Found 10 have committed the offense 
Found not to nave committed the offense 
::·a :ej :o Rppaar on 3n infraction -- default entered 
r,Ovi TrlEREFOF:E::. Jud1;:r:ent is h.:;reby entered: • 
,st ,no dr;t.?-nd::;nt · 
(NarneJ 
=.<2:_,,1-~;-1du1it's otiv1ng p11vdeges ,He su':;pended fo, _____ (days) \muntns) 
Fer the defendant 
L- W1thneld judgment (misdemeanor only) 
'er :.ne cl,arr;e :if r-1e cifense of ________ in v,olat131,of section ----+---- and: 
THE 0ffENG~!_S_HfREBY ORDERE~' ~0 ing fixed penalty r fine: . t. ;j. 
~'.',~ity ~r-i1ne S -5f/V... ,-f5b-- Cost\$ .. __ ,- . _-; . . _ Jail ~ .. ~ 7_<-
-~,1,,-,c·,1,,Lu __ - _ ------; ________ ,[ Q, ptcf,Utu11 t Ni. ___ $L2 
l_,_,11J:i.,.:_1·1s ur·,:_; ~-\_..~/ ... •i.:iik:'ilt:1.1 (,rJers __ -- -------- --- - , ~r_ -- -----
Dat,,d: t· _,If ;;;lo_ 
STArE F IDAHO 
COiJI\JTY or ADA 
Tl1e unrJersign<,d Clerk of tr,e above entitled co rt bi certities that the foregoing is a true and 
corrsct c0v:, of tr,e original judg,nent or the court record on file 1n this oHice. 
Da!i?-'.l: __ . --·-------··-- Clerk or Deputy 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
NO·------~--
,._. A.M _____ F_ILED ~ -
PM.~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 










) _______________ ) 
Criminal No. CR-MD-2009-7676 
ORDER ST A YING EXECUTION OF 
SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL 
The Court having before it Defendant's Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence Pending 
Appeal, and good cause appearing; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein 
shall be, and is hereby, STAYED sppeal in the above-entitled case. 
DA TED this Jt_ day o 20~~ 
ORDER TO CORRECT JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
000038
RE~l,IVED IN TRANSCRIPTS 
__ /Jft/!L_::~------
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO. 
AM FILED \.j 
----P.M 7 200 West Front Street, Suite 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
1107 
JAN O 6 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO Cl rk 
By ERIN BULCHEA 
8 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 










Criminal No. MD 09 7676 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
JOSEPH VOSS JR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, THE 
THROUGH THE BOISE CITY ATTORNEY, 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 









1. The above-named Defendant-Appellant, JOSEPH VOSS 
JR, appeals against the State of Idaho to the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 
from the Judgment of Conviction in Case No. MD 09 
7676, entered on the 4th day of January, 2010, 
and sentenced on the 4th day of January, 2010, 
pursuant to a conditional plea of guilty entered 
on October 28, 2009 in the Magistrate Division of 
the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, the 
Honorable Judge Oths presiding. 
2. That the party has right to appeal to 
District Court, and the judgment described 
paragraph one above is appealable under 
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3 . The following 
requested: 
additional transcript(s) are 
Suppression Hearing Transcript from the 9th day 
of September, 2009 
4. I certify: 
a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal 
has been served on the reporter. 
b) That the Appellant is exempt from 
paying the estimated transcript fee 
because he is an indigent person and is 
unable to pay said fee. 
c) That the Appellant is exempt from 
paying the estimated fee for 
preparation of the record because he is 
an indigent person and is unable to pay 
said fee. 
d) That the Appellant 
paying the appellate 
he is indigent and 
said fee. 
is exempt from 
filing fee because 
is unable to pay 
e) That service has been made upon all 
parties required to be served, pursuant 
to I.A.R. 20. 
5. That the appeal is taken upon all matters of law 
and fact. 
6. That the Defendant-Appellant anticipates raising 
issues including but not limited to: 
a) Whether the Trial 
denying Appellant' 
DATED, this 6th day of Ja 
Court erred in 
to suppress. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 6th day of January, 2010, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the: 
Boise City Attorney 
by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Page 3 
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NO,__,, ________ _ 
(f ~ FILED 
A,M__._ ___ _,PM ___ _ 
JAN 11 2010 
J_QDAVIB NAV~O, Clep, 
By ·-~ C-L,1o ,~ ~- \ .. /<---'---
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 










) Case No. CRMD-2009-0007676 
) 
) NOTICE OF PREPARATION 




An Order for transcript was filed in the above-entitled matter on January 06 2010, and a copy of 
said Order was received by the Transcription Department on January 11, 2010. I certify the 
estimated cost of preparation of the transcript to be: 
Type of Hearing: Appeal 
Date of Hearing: January 4, 2010 Judge: Michael Oths 
18 Pages x $3.25 = $58.50 
In this case, the Ada County Public Defender's Office has agreed to pay for the cost of the transcript 
fee upon completion of the transcript. 
The Transcription Department will prepare the transcript and file it with the Clerk of the District 
Court within thirty (30) days (or expedited days) from the date of this notice. The transcriber may 
make application to the District Judge for an extension of time in which to prepare the transcript. 
Date: This 11th day of January, 2010 
RAEANN NIXON I 
Transcript Coordinator 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPT - Page 1 
000042
-· 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this 11th day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy of the Notice of Preparation 
of Transcript was forwarded to Defendant's attorney of record, by first class mail, at: 
Ada Co. Public Defender 
200 W. Front St. Ste. 1107 
Boise ID 83702 
ANITA MOORE 
Transcript Coordinator 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH VOSS, JR., 
Defendant/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent. 
Case No. CRMD090007676 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all 
the testimony of the original trial or hearing is required by Appellant to resolve the issues 
on appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That Appellant shall order and pay for the estimated cost of the transcript 
within 14 days after the filing of the notice of appeal. 
2) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the date of the 
notice of the filing of the transcript. 
3) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service 
of appellant's brief. 
4) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after 
service of respondent's brief. 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 1 
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5) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all 
briefs are filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither 
party does so notice for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and 
decide the case on the briefs and the record. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
l./--
1 hereby certify that on this \JI day of January, 2010 I mailed (served) a 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ADA COUI\JTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 




c LE:.D 7 TcY - ' '.1 _________ f),M ___ ~Ll_ __ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi FOURTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT 
,, 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF TDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. CRMD0907676 
NOTlCE OF FlLlNG 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(p), the transcript of the proceedings dated January 4, 2010 is now filed. 
Dalcd this 2nd day of March, 20 I 0. 
J. DA YID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
j'\[J NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - PAGE 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of March, 2010, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
BOISE CITY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: ---'--'---"--------"---"--"''-=--'c__;=----+-+-'"=---------
Depu ty Clerk 
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TN THE DTSTRTCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDTCTAL DTSTRTCT OF 
J D1" , 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA--~ rt---L:>,eu..---, 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. CRMD0907676 
NOTICE OF FILING 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(p), the transcript of the proceedings dated September 9, 2009 is now filed. 
Dated this 9th day of March, 20 l 0. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
~ NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - PAGE 1 
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·1....,,' ·-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of March, 2010, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
BOISE CITY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 




J. DA YID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - PAGE 2 
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·-
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
._ NO 0 
FILED A.M, ____ _..M._,. _____ _ 
APR O 1 2010 
,I. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By SCARLETT RAMIREZ 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 












Criminal No. CR-MD-2009-7676 
MOTION AND STIPULATION TO 
EXTEND TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant/Appellant, JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., by and 
through his Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, ANITA MOORE, 
handling attorney, and, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, hereby moves this 
Honorable Court for its Order granting an extension of twenty-eight (28) days to file the Brief of 
Appellant. This Motion is supported by (a) the Affidavit of Anita Moore, attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit A, and (b) the stipulation of counsel for 
Plaintiff/Respondent below. 
DATED, this JJ.d:__ day of April, 2010. 
ANITA M. E. MOORE ..__ ___ _ 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
So stipulated. 
DATED, this _j_ day of April, 2010. ' I 
Attor ey for Plaintiff/Respondent 
MOTION AND STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF APPELLANT, 
--r. Page 1 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
APR O 1 1.:J;· 
,J. DAVID NAVAF,F<) .. >. 
By SCARLETT Ar.. , 
DEPUn 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plain tiff /Respondent, 
vs. 











Criminal No. CR-MD-2009-7676 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND 
TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
________________ ) 
State of Idaho 




1. I am counsel for the Joseph A. Voss, Jr. in the above-entitled appeal. 
2. Brief of Appellant in the above-entitled appeal is currently due on April 6, 2010. 
3. No previous extensions of time for filing Brief of Appellant have been requested, granted 
or denied in the above-entitled appeal. 
4. This request is made upon the following grounds: 
a. I am a deputy in the magistrate division of the Ada County Public Defender's 
Office, and have a heavy caseload. 
b. In recent weeks, I have had insufficient out-of-court time for both working on this 
brief and also attending to the many other matters I must deal with in the office 
when I am not in court. 
c. For the last two and a half weeks, I have been ill. At one point during this illness, 
I had to request permission from my team leader to go home early. I made two 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO 
FILE BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Page 1 
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visits to the doctor's office during this illness, and was diagnosed with an ear 
infection and a viral infection. At this writing, I am still suffering the effects of 
the illness. 
d. I have jury trials set for next week, at least two of which I expect to go. 
e. I am deprived of preparation time for the remainder of this week and for the 
weekend, because I am scheduled to be out of the office Thursday afternoon and 
Friday, and because of religious observances connected with the Easter Triduum 
and Easter Sunday, and obligations I undertook long ago in connection with them. 
5. I am requesting an extension of 28 days, with an expected due date of May 4, 2010, in 
order to take advantage of a relative lull in court that I expect to have in the coming 
weeks, and to ensure that the new due date does not again fall on one of my jury trial 
weeks. 
6. Jared Stubbs, counsel for Plaintiff Appellant, has agreed to my request for an extension, 
per email exchange and per his stipulation entered on my Motion for Extension. 
7. I believe 28 days will be sufficient time to complete the Brief, because during those 28 
days between the current due date and the proposed new one, I expect to have more out 
of court time than I have had recently. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUG 
AFFIANT 
JURAT 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO 
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-
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 





Criminal No. CRMD090007676 
ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF 
TIME 
The above entitled matter, having come before this Court, 
and good cause appearing therefrom; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the 
Defendant-Appellant is granted an extension of twenty-eight (28) 
days to file the Appellant's Brief. The Appellant's Brief will 
now be due on the l 14-"day of 
DATED, this~ day of 
-1\w(-~-++-------' 2 010. 
April, 29}~; 
~ 'k 0 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
District Judge 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME 
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Def end ant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409 
NO.-------F=1L=c:o:--:-C--tA-
A.M _____ P.M . .....,\ 
MAY 1 O 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By SCARLETT AAMIAf:2' 
OEPU1'Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 











Criminal No. MD 09 7676 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
_______________ ) 
COMES NOW, the above-named Appellant, JOSEPH VOSS, JR., by and through his 
Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, ANITA MOORE, handling 
attorney, and hereby submits the following Appellant's Brief to the Court. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Joseph August Voss, Jr., appeals from the magistrate court's denial of his 
Motion to Suppress. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS OF THE CASE 
On April 8, 2009, Joseph Voss was charged with the misdemeanor offenses of possession 
of drug paraphernalia and carrying a concealed weapon. These charges arose from the fruits of a 
search of Mr. Voss' car. Mr. Voss filed a Motion to Suppress on July 14, 2009. This motion 
came on for hearing before the Hon. Michael Oths on September 9, 2009. On September 16, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 1 
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2009, the court filed a written opinion and order denying Mr. Voss' Motion to Suppress. Mr. 
Voss entered his Conditional Plea of Guilty, preserving his right to appeal this order, on October 
28, 2009, and was sentenced on January 4, 2010. The court stayed execution of judgment on Mr. 
Voss' motion, and the present appeal was timely filed. 
On April 8, 2009, David Roberts, assistant principal at Timberline High School, received 
information that an unknown citizen was reporting Mr. Voss as having driven in an unsafe 
manner into the parking lot at Timberline High School. Transcript of hearing on Motion to 
Suppress, September 9, 2009 ("Tr.") p. 6-7, 9. When, at a later time, he approached Mr. Voss 
about the incident, Mr. Roberts noticed the smell of cigarette smoke on Mr. Voss' person. Tr. at 
10. Mr. Roberts was aware that Mr. Voss was 18 and therefore old enough to smoke without 
violating the law, although the Boise City School District prohibits possession of tobacco on 
school grounds. Tr. at 11. Mr. Roberts decided to conduct what he called a "reasonable 
suspicion search." Tr. at 12-13. Mr. Roberts testified as follows regarding how a "reasonable 
suspicion search" is customarily conducted: 
Q. (By Mr. Stubbs): Okay. And when you conduct a search of a student, what 
do you search? Do you search just the student's person? 
A. We do not. Typical practice would be to ask the student to empty their 
pockets. Typical practice would usually include asking them first, is there 
anything that you have on you that I should be aware of and often students will 
tum over anything they've got at that point that they shouldn't have. If they 
don't, then we would continue on at that point and ask them to empty their 
pockets. We would look in their back pack. We would look in the locker, if they 
have a locker. And if they have driven a car to school, if their school (sic) is 
parked on school grounds, it is usual procedure to also look in the car . 
. . .I don't like to be doing a reasonable suspicion search or a search of any kind by 
myself and it is usual procedure for me to include the security officer and the 
police officer at that time to assist in my search. 
Tr. at 8-9, 18 11. 13-17. 
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On this occasion, Mr. Roberts enlisted the aid of Officer Ted Arnold, the school resource 
officer, and Leslie McChristy, the civilian security officer. Tr. at 13. At the suppression hearing, 
the state stipulated that Off. Arnold was a member of the Boise City Police Department, Tr. at 3, 
11. 5-11; also, Mr. Roberts testified that Off. Arnold was an employee of the Boise City Police 
Department, Tr. at 14, 11. 4-5. Mr. Roberts testified that the decision to search Mr. Voss' car 
was solely his. Tr. at 14. However, he also testified that both he and Off. Arnold searched the 
car together, and found what he described as "numerous items that were of concern. Tr. at 15, 11. 
16-18; Tr. at 19, 11. 14-25. This search turned up a set of brass knuckles and drug paraphernalia. 
Tr. at 15 11. 20-24. The present charges ensued. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in holding that the assistant principal' s search of Mr. Voss' car was 
reasonable in all the circumstances? 
2. Did the trial court err in holding that the same relaxed standard of suspicion applied to the 
police officer conducting the search of Joseph Voss' car as to the assistant principal who 
also searched Mr. Voss' car, such that the police officer could legally search the car 
without probable cause? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the trial court's order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the 
standard of review is bifurcated. The appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the trial court's application of constitutional 
principles in light of the facts found. State v. Purdum, 14 7 Idaho 206, 207 (2009), citing State v. 
Watts, 142 Idaho 230 (2005) and State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007). 




I. The Search of Joseph Voss' Car Based on the Smell of Cigarette Smoke on His 
Person Was Unreasonable in the Circumstances. 
The seminal case on searches of students and their effects by school officials is New 
Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). In that case, T.L.O., a 
high school freshman, was caught with another student smoking in the restroom. Questioned by 
the assistant vice-principal, Theodore Choplick, T.L.O. denied not only smoking on that 
occasion, but smoking at all. Choplick brought T.L.O. into his private office, demanded to see 
her purse, and retrieved a pack of cigarettes. While reaching in for the cigarettes, Choplick 
noticed a package of rolling papers, which prompted him to conduct a more thorough search of 
the purse. This search turned up some marijuana, a pipe, some empty plastic bags, a large 
quantity of one-dollar bills, and some papers that implicated T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. Based 
on these discoveries, T.L.O.'s mother took her to police headquarters, where she confessed to 
dealing in marijuana. 
During the course of the delinquency proceedings brought against her, T.L.O. moved to 
suppress the fruits of the purse search, including the evidence found in the purse and the 
subsequent confession. Among the issues before the U.S. Supreme Court was the question 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to searches by school officials. Citing a string of 
precedents applying the Fourth Amendment to civil authorities and subjecting school authorities 
to the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
answered in the affirmative. The Court noted: 
If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they 
should be deemed to be exercising parental authority rather than public authority 
when conducting searches of their students .... More generally, the Court has 
recognized that "the concept of parental delegation" as a source of school 
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authority is not entirely "consonant with compulsory education laws." ... Today's 
public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on 
them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated 
educational and disciplinary policies ... .In carrying out searches and other 
disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as 
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they 
cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. 
TL.O., 469 U.S. at 336-337 (cites omitted). 
In finding that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of students by school officials, 
the Court declined to hold that the public schools surrogate parents immune to the demands of 
the Fourth Amendment, however, it did hold that balancing a student's legitimate expectations of 
privacy against the school's legitimate need to maintain an orderly learning environment 
required a somewhat relaxed standard with regard to the prerequisites for a legal school search. 
Thus, the Court held that the warrant requirement does not apply to school officials conducting a 
search of a student under their authority. TL. 0. at 340. The Court also took the position that the 
suspicion needed to justify such a search need not rise to the level of probable cause. The Court 
developed a two-part test: 
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, 
one must consider "whether the ... action was justified at its inception," Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879; second, one must determine whether the 
search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place," ibid. Under 
ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official 
will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will tum up evidence that the student has violated or is 
violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be 
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the 
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of 
the student and the nature of the infraction. 
TL.O. at 341-342 (footnotes omitted). 
It should be emphasized that, whereas the search in the present case involves not only the 
assistant principal but a Boise City police officer - a complication shortly to be addressed - the 
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TL. 0. Court was very careful to note that its holding applied only to searches by school 
personnel: 
We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone 
and on their own authority. This case does not present the question of the 
appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school 
officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we 
express no opinion on that question. 
TL. 0. at 342, fn. 7 ( emphasis added). 
More recently, the Supreme Court revisited the question of school searches in Safford 
Unified School District v. Redding,_ U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009). Safford was a§ 1983 
action arising out of a strip search conducted by middle school officials in a quest to discover 
ibuprofen and naproxen tablets. The Supreme Court held that, although the school officials had 
a high enough level of suspicion to justify a search, the scope of the search in that case - making 
the student pull out her underwear and expose her private parts - coupled with the relatively 
benign nature of the contraband in question, was unreasonable. "[W]hat was missing from the 
suspected facts that pointed to [ appellee] was any indication of danger to the students from the 
power of the drugs or their quantity, and any reason to suppose that [ appellee] was carrying pills 
in her underwear. We think that the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the 
search reasonable .... [T]he TL.O. concern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires 
the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of 
wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and 
backpacks to exposure of intimate parts." Safford, 129 S.Ct. at 2642-2643. 
A key point that emerges from TL. 0. and Safford is that there must be some connection 
between the contraband sought and the place and extent of the search. 1 In the present case, the 
1 It is clear that the Safford Court found the strip search of the appellee so intrusive, given what was being sought in 
the search, as to almost shock the conscience. Mr. Voss is not suggesting that the search of his car is somehow 
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search of Joseph Voss' car was prompted by the smell of tobacco smoke on his person. Even if 
this search is viewed strictly as a search by a school official, it is unreasonable in view of the 
scope and manner of the search, the age of the student and the nature of the infraction. The 
relationship between the suspicion that Mr. Voss was violating a school rule by smoking on 
campus on the other hand, and what he might be carrying in his car on the other, is practically 
non-existent. The search for tobacco products in the car is even more problematic in view of the 
fact that (a) tobacco products are not, in and of themselves, illegal; and (b) Mr. Voss was 18 at 
the time of the search, and therefore could lawfully possess tobacco products. As noted above, it 
is clear from Assistant Principal Roberts' testimony that at the time he searched the car, he knew 
Mr. Voss was 18. The search was not tailored to deal with the suspected violation. It was 
therefore excessively intrusive, and the trial court should have suppressed the evidence 
discovered in the search. 
II. Because a Boise City Police Officer Searched Joseph Voss' Car without Probable 
Cause, The Fruits of this Search Must Be Suppressed. 
The present case is distinguishable from both TL.O. and Safford in that it was a search, 
not merely by school officials, but also by a law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding the trial 
court's ruling that the participation of the police officer in this search made no difference, Mr. 
Voss maintains that the search of his car by a police officer without probable cause violated his 
rights, and that the fruits of this search must be suppressed. 
A warrantless search is per se unreasonable in the absence of a well-delineated exception 
to the warrant requirement. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660 (2007), citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). An officer's warrantless 
equivalent to a strip search of an adolescent girl for ibuprofen tablets. What he is suggesting is that, like in Safford, 
there is no reasonable line of suspicion between the infraction suspected - smoking on campus - and the search of 
his car. 
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entry of a vehicle to search it or to seize items within is presumed to violate the Fourth 
Amendments prohibition against unreasonable searches, unless the state shows that it falls within 
one of the narrowly-drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Munoz, _ Idaho 
, 2009 WL 464153 (Ct.App.2009), citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, cited above, and State 
v. Gomez, 144 Idaho 865 (Ct.App.2007). Police may search a car without a warrant only if there 
is probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Id. 
During the suppression hearing in the present case, the state was at pains to establish that 
the decision to conduct a search was solely that of Assistant Principal Roberts. Tr. at 13-14. 
Nevertheless, Off. Ted Arnold of the Boise City Police Department participated actively in the 
search from its inception; both he and Mr. Roberts found items that led to criminal charges 
against Mr. Voss. The trial court rightly held that the search was not consensual: based on Mr. 
Roberts' testimony, Mr. Voss acquiesced to the show of authority under protest. Nor was there 
probable cause to search. The testimony shows that the basis for the search was the request of 
assistant principal Roberts, who smelled smoke on the person of Mr. Voss, who was of an age 
legally to smoke. Off. Arnold therefore had no basis to make a probable cause determination 
that the car needed to be searched. 
Although this appears to be an issue of first impression in Idaho, courts in other 
jurisdictions have held that a school search involving law enforcement officers must be 
supported by probable cause. In State v. K.L.M, 278 Ga.App. 219, 628 S.E.2d 651 (Ga.App. 
2006), a school principal, acting on a tip, called in a POST-certified law enforcement officer to 
search a student for evidence of drug dealing. The officer conducted the search, found 
contraband, and arrested the student. Citing earlier precedent, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's order to suppress the evidence, on the grounds that the police officer 
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lacked probable cause to conduct the search. With regard to the Fourth Amendment, said the 
court, 
there are really three groups: private persons; governmental agents whose conduct 
is state action invoking the Fourth Amendment; and governmental law 
enforcement agents for whose violations of the Fourth Amendment the 
exclusionary rule will be applied .... 
[T]he intermediate group includes school officials, whose conduct is "subject only 
to the most minimal restraints necessary to insure that students are not 
whimsically stripped of personal privacy and subjected to petty tyranny .... 
But the [Georgia] Supreme Court took care to "emphasize that the standards 
announced here for action by school officials will pass constitutional muster only 
if those officials are acting in their proper capacity and the search is free of 
involvement by law enforcement personnel." 
K.L.M., 628 S.E.2d at 652-653 (emphasis in original), quoting State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 
496(2), 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975). Thus, Georgia has adopted a bright-line rule that whenever a 
police officer is involved in a school search, that search must be supported by probable cause. 
In A.JM v. State, 617 So.2d 1137 (Fla. App. Dist. 1, 1993), Florida's First District Court 
of Appeal threw out a search conducted by a school resource officer at the behest of the school 
principal. In that case, the school resource officer happened to be passing by the principal's 
office when he noticed a group of students in the office. The principal told the officers he 
wanted the students searched based on information he had that the students had some drug 
involvement. At that point, the appellant tried to leave the building, but the officer caught him, 
patted him down, and found cocaine on his person. The Florida court noted that the officer went 
ahead and conducted the search without any independent information or investigation on his own 
part, based solely on the principal's request. The court held that since the officer clearly 
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conducted the search, and therefore "directed. participated in or acquiesced in the search," he 
needed probable cause; and probable cause was lacking in that case. A.JM, 617 So.2d at 1138.2 
In the present case, a school resource officer who is an employee, not of the school 
district, but of the Boise City Police Department, participated very actively in the search of 
Joseph Voss' car. He did so at the behest of the assistant principal, and on the basis of no 
investigation of his own or any independent information. He was not a mere bystander to the 
search, but actually searched the car together with the assistant principal, and turned up some of 
the items that led to the present charges. He did this without probable cause to believe that Mr. 
Voss had violated the law. 
Because the school resource officer conducted a warrantless search of Mr. Voss' car 
without probable cause, the trial court should have suppressed the fruits of this search. This 
court must therefore reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The warrantless search of Joseph Voss' car was unreasonable and without probable 
cause. Simply as a search by a school official, it was unreasonable in all the circumstances. But 
since a Boise City Police officer actively participated in this search. the standard is not merely 
reasonable suspicion, but probable cause. Probable cause is distinctly lacking in this case. The 
trial court's order denying Joseph Voss' motion to suppress the fruits of this illegal search must 
be reversed. 
DATED, this 10 day of May, 2010. 
ANITA MOORE 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
2 It must be admitted that Florida's courts are not unanimous on this issue. Florida's Second District Court of 
Appeal reached the opposite conclusion in State v. NG.B., 806 So.2d 567 (Fla. 2d Dist.Ct.App. 2002), involving a 
school resource officer search at the behest of a school official. 
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COMES NOW, the State by and through Jared B. Stubbs, Assistant City Attorney, and 
hereby files its Respondent's Brief in the above-captioned matter . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURE 
On April 4, 2009, Assistant Principle David Roberts (Roberts) of Timberline High School 
conducted a reasonable suspicion search for tobacco cigarettes in the defendant's car. (Tr. p. 15, 
Ls. 16-17). Leslie McChristy (McChristy), and Ted Arnold (Officer Arnold) assisted Roberts in 
his search. (Tr. p. 13, Ls. 10-13). McChristy, a school security officer, was a school district 
employee and Officer Arnold, the school resource officer, was a Boise City Police Officer. (Tr. 
p. 13, L. 20 through p. 14, L. 5). Roberts conducted the search but during the search Officer 
Arnold entered the car and searched as well. (Tr. p. 17, L. 23). Roberts and Officer Arnold 
found brass knuckles and drug paraphernalia inside the defendant's car. (Tr. p. 15, Ls. 20-24). 
The defendant was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and carrying a concealed 
weapon. (Boise City Police Report # 909-128). 
The defendant pied not guilty to the charges and filed a motion to suppress the brass 
knuckles and drug paraphernalia found in the search. The magistrate court held a hearing on the 
motion on September 11, 2009. The court denied the defendant's motion and on January 4, 
20 I 0, the defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charges. On January 6, 2010, the 
defendant appealed the magistrate court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether school officials had reasonable suspicion to search the defendant's car? 
2. Whether the scope of the search was reasonable? 














A. The Search Assistant Principle Roberts Conducted Was Reasonable Under All 
Circumstances. 
"The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to 
searches conducted by public school officials and is not limited to searches carried out by law 
enforcement otlicers. /iew Jersey , .. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, I 05 S.Ct. 733, 734 (2009). 1 For 
school searches, "the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of 
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause:· id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742. ··The required 
knowledge component of reasonable suspicion for a school administrator's evidence search is 
that it raise a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing ... Safford Unified School Dist . 
No. I ,·. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2635 (2009). 
Courts use a two prong inquiry to determine the legality of a reasonable suspicion search. 
Neit· Jersey v. TLO.. 469 U.S. 325, 342, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742 ( 1985). First, a reasonable 
suspicion search of a student must be justified at its inception. Id. at 342, I 05 S.Ct. at 743; citing 
Terrv ,·. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, ( 1968); second, "one must determine whether 
the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances.,,. T.L. 0. 
469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 743. 
1 The Supreme Court specifically states that the holding in the T.L.O. case only applies to school authorities acting 
alone and on their own authority. New Jersey\'. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342, I 05 S.Ct. 733, 743. T.L.O. does not 
address the issue of law enforcement acting in conjunction with or at the behest of school authorities. New Jersey,·. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342, 105 S.Ct. 733, 743. However, courts across the nation have begun to apply the T.L.O., or 














1. The Search Assistant Principle Roberts Conducted was Justified in its Inception 
Because He Had Reasonable Grounds to Suspect the Defendant Possessed 
Tobacco . 
A search is "'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or 
the rules ofthe school." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 743 (school officials 
questioned a student after she was caught smoking in the bathroom); see Safford Un(fied School 
Dist., 129 S.Ct. at 2639, (school officials questioned a student after they had evidence that she 
possessed prescription drugs without a prescription); Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 192 (8th Cir . 
1987 (students were questioned after a school official discovered they had been in the locker 
room at the time a theft had occurred). 
In the present case, Roberts searched the defendant's car for tobacco cigarettes. (Tr. p. 15, 
Ls. 16-17). Roberts' suspicion was initially aroused after he called the defendant to his office to 
question him regarding an allegation that he had driven in an unsafe manner on school grounds. 
(Tr. p. 9, Ls. 20-22 through p. 10, Ls. 2-5). When the defendant entered Roberts' office he 
smelled of tobacco and the possession of tobacco on school grounds, regardless of age, was a 
violation of school rules. (Tr. p. 11, Ls. I 0-12, 15). The smell led Roberts to believe that the 
defendant had recently been smoking cigarettes and that he still had them in his possession. (Tr. 
p. 12, L. 24 through p.13, L 1 ). It was not until after Roberts made these observations that he 
decided to search the defendant's car. (Tr. p. 13, Ls. 6-7). 
2. The Scope of the Search of the Defendant's Car Was Legal Because It Was In a 
Place Where Students Traditionally Hide things. 
A reasonable suspicion search is permissible when it is "not excessively intrusive in light 


















129 S.Ct. at 2642. Specific to the location of a search, a school official must have a reasonable 
suspicion that the item(s) they are looking for can be found in that place. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 
346, 105 S.Ct. at 745. One way the reasonableness of a location can be determined is by looking 
in places where students typically hide things. Safford Un(fied School Dist., I 29 S.Ct. at 2642 . 
(the search of the defendant's underwear was not justified because there was not a general 
practice among students of hiding things in intimate places). 
At the suppression hearing, Roberts testified that the defendant smelled like tobacco, he 
knew that students in his school commonly hid things in their lockers, bags, and cars and he 
knew the defendant had recently been in his car. (Tr. p. 8, L. 16 through p. 9, L. 3). The 
decision to search the defendant's car was a logical conclusion based on Robert's knowledge and 
expenence . 
B. Officer Arnold Did Not Need Probable Cause To Participate In The Search of the 
Defendant's Car Because He Was Working In Conjunction With a School Official. 
Idaho courts have not ruled on the issue of law enforcement searches of students on 
school grounds. However there is case law on the subject from other jurisdictions. These cases 
have drawn a distinction between school searches that require probable cause and those that only 
need reasonable suspicion. In re D.D., 146 N.C.App. 309,318,554 S.E.2d 346,352 (2001). In 
In re D.D., the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that there are three types or categories of 
school searches that law enforcement officials can conduct or participate in without having 
probable cause. Id. 
The first is a search where law enforcement acts in conjunction with school officials, a 


















involvement is minimal." Id. The next is a search conducted by a school resource officer "based 
upon his own investigation" and the last is a search conducted by school resource officer "at the 
direction of another school official." Id. The court held that as long as the purpose of the search 
is to maintain discipline, order, or student safety the reasonable suspicion standard applies to law 
enforcement officials. Id. 146 N.C.App. at 318, 554 S.E.2d at 352-353. However, when law 
enforcement officials conduct a search as part of an independent police investigation then the 
police must have probable cause to justify the search. Id. 
In Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 37 Ed. Law Rep. 473 (8th Cir. 1987 the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of reasonable suspicion searches conducted in conjunction 
with law enforcement. In Cason, the vice principle of a school decided to investigate a report 
that items had been stolen from students' lockers and she asked the school liaison officer to assist 
her. Id. During the course of her investigation the vice principle questioned and searched 
several students and the liaison officer did a pat down search on one of the students. Id. at 190. 
The court held that the search was constitutional because the officer's involvement in the 
investigation was limited and the search served the "interest of preserving swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures in schools." Id. 
In Martens r. District No. 220, Bd. of Educ., 620 F.Supp. 29 (D.C.Ill. 1985) the Northern 
District, Eastern Division, of the United States District Court of Illinois addressed the issue of 
reasonable suspicion searches conducted by law enforcement officials on their own accord. In 
Martens, school officials detained a student because they suspected he possessed a controlled 
substance. Id. at 30-31. The student refused to consent to a search and so the school attempted 
to contact the student's parents. Id. While the school tried to contact his parents a county 
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sheriff's deputy, who was at the school on an unrelated matter, approached the student and told 
him that it would be in his best interests to comply with the search. Id. The student then emptied 
his pockets where the deputy found a marijuana pipe with marijuana residue. Id. 
When the officer's actions were challenged the court ruled that he did not need probable 
cause for the search because (I) the officer did not develop the facts used for the search, (2) the 
officer did not direct school officials' actions, (3) the search was not a cooperative law 
enforcement action, and ( 4) the student would have been searched whether or not the officer was 
present. Id. 620 F.Supp. at 32. 
Likewise, in the case at bar, Officer Arnold did not need probable cause to assist in the 
search of the defendant's car. Roberts developed the facts for the search, Roberts initiated the 
search, and the search was not part of a criminal investigation. In addition to Officer Arnold, 
Leslie McChristy the school security guard assisted Roberts in his search, therefore had Officer 
Arnold not been present McChristy could have provided sufficient assistance to allow Roberts to 
conduct his search. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above arguments, the Appellant requests the Court deny the defendant's 
appeal of the Motion to Suppress. 
Jar 
A 1stant City Attorney 
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REPLY BRIEF 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant/Appellant, JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., by and 
through his Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, ANITA MOORE, 
handling attorney, and hereby submits the following Appellant's Reply Brief. 
I. A City Police Officer, Who Is Employed By the Police Department and Not by the 
School District, Must Have Probable Cause to Conduct a Car Search; An Officer 
Who Has No Evidence of Criminal Activity May Not Lawfully Search a Student's 
Car. 
The cases from other jurisdictions that the State cites in support of its argument that Off. 
Arnold did not need probable cause to search Joseph Voss' car are not apposite. They do not 
support the proposition that a city police officer who (a) is employed by the police department 
and not by the school district, and (b) has no evidence of criminal activity, does not need 
probable cause to conduct a car search. Off. Arnold conducted the search solely on the basis that 
Assistant Principal Roberts smelled tobacco on the person of Mr. Voss who, being 18, could not 
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have been violating the law merely by possessing tobacco. 
In In the Matter of D.D., 554 S.E.2d 346 (Ct.App.N.C.2001), though the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals opined that the T.L. 0. standard should apply in cases where law enforcement 
acts in conjunction with school officials, the facts of the case bear closer examination. In D.D., 
the school principal received information that a group of girls, including one of his own students, 
was planning to come to his campus to fight at the end of the school day. Id. at 348. Before the 
close of the school day, the principle and the school resource officer stationed themselves at 
opposite ends of the school building, and the principle saw four girls, three of whom he did not 
recognize, gathered in a restricted parking lot. Id. He then "gathered" the school resource 
officer and two other police officers and went to confront the girls. Id. The girls who were not 
his students started to become "profane and vulgar" and joked about not being in school where 
they belonged, and gave him false information as to their identities; the principal and the officers 
detained them while their information was investigated. Meanwhile, one of the officers asked 
one of the girls (not D.D.) to let him search her purse, "grabbed" the purse, and found a box 
cutter. Id. at 349. Afterwards, they were taken to the principal's office and made to empty their 
pockets. Id. D.D. turned out to have a knife in her pocket. Id. 
D.D. is readily distinguishable from the instant case in several respects. To begin with, 
the officers could observe for themselves the presence on campus of three school-age girls who 
did not belong there, at a time when they should have been at their own school, and who in fact 
joked about not being where they belonged. Thus, they would have had probable cause to 
believe that what in Idaho would have been a status offense was being committed in their 
presence. This, coupled with the girls' behavior - even without the principal's information about 
a planned fight - and the fact that classes were being dismissed during the incident, with students 
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streaming out of the school building, meant that there was a need to defuse a potentially 
dangerous situation. No such circumstances exist in the present case, in which, at most, there 
was a possibility that Mr. Voss was breaking a school rule against smoking on campus. D.D. 
therefore does not support the state's contention that Off. Arnold did not need probable cause to 
search Mr. Voss' car. 1 
Similarly, Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8 th Cir.1987), a § 1983 case cited by the state, 
presents a set of facts that sharply distinguishes that case from the present case. In Cason, the 
vice principal conducted questioning of several students, including appellant, about thefts from 
school lockers. Id. at 190. The school liaison officer - who had neither a police uniform nor a 
marked patrol car, and whose position was jointly paid for by the police department and the 
school district - was present for the questioning of appellant, but did not participate. Id. At one 
point during the questioning, the vice-principal dumped out the contents of appellant's purse and 
found a coin purse that exactly matched the description of a coin purse that had been reported 
stolen. Id. The liaison officer then pat-searched appellant, though it is not recorded that this 
search produced any further incriminating evidence. id. The officer later participated in further 
questioning, after the vice-principal had independently secured more evidence against appellant. 
Id. 
ln Cason, it is clear that the incriminating evidence was secured by the vice-principal and 
not by the police officer, who merely observed. To the extent the officer played any active part 
in the incident, it was only after the vice-principal had turned up incriminating evidence in the 
1 It is also worth noting that the D.D. court observed that "[g]enerally, cases applying the TL.O. standard to searches 
conducted pursuant to the school police officer's own investigation, do so where the officer is '"employed by a 
school district[,]"' rather than the local police department." D.D., 554 S.E.2d 346, 354 (cites omitted). The 
evidence is clear in the instant case that Off. Arnold is not a school district employee but an employee for the Boise 
City Police. 
The D.D. court was also at pains to emphasize the minimal role the police officers played in the subject 
incident. By contrast, in this case, Off. Arnold was a main player, on a par with Vice Principal Roberts, in the 
search giving rise to the present appeal. 
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ot1icer's presence, thereby giving her probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed 
and that appellant had committed it. The officer conducted a pat-search only after the vice-
principal found stolen property in appellant's purse; and even then, the record does not reflect 
that the pat-search revealed anything. By the time the ot1icer actively questioned appellant and 
her friend, the vice-principal had already gotten evidence against appellant via independent 
questioning. 
By contrast, in this case, the city police officer played an active role in the investigation 
and searched Mr. Voss' car without probable cause. Unlike the officer in Casen, who hung back 
until the appellant was found to be in possession of stolen property, Off Arnold had no evidence 
whatsoever linking the 18-year-old Joseph Voss to the commission of a crime. Cason v. Cook 
therefore fails to support the state's contention that Off. Arnold did not need probable cause to 
search Mr. Voss' car.2 
Finally, Martens v. District No. 220, 620 F.Supp. 29 (N.D.111.1985), another civil rights 
case, is of no help to the state in establishing the lawfulness of the search in this case. In 
Martens, the dean of students, acting on a tip, brought appellant into her office, confronted him 
about information she had that he had drug paraphernalia on his person, and asked him to 
consent to a search. Id. at 30. He refused until his parents were contacted. Id. While the dean 
tried to contact his parents, a sheriffs deputy, on campus on other business, happened into her 
office. Id. at 31. This deputy had not hitherto participated in any aspect of the dean's 
investigation. Id. He told appellant that, based on his experience, appellant would be better off 
cooperating with school officials, then asked him to empty his pockets. Appellant consented and 
2 Incidentally, Cason also presents a situation in which the distinction between police officer and school official is, 
to some extent, blurred. The school liaison officer was a police officer but not readily identifiable as such by sight, 
and was in a position funded jointly by the police department and the school district. Cason, 810 F.2d at 190. In 
this case, as has been pointed out in previous briefing, Off. Arnold is unequivocally an employee of the Boise City 
Police Department. 
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yielded up a marijuana pipe. 
The "search" in Martens, then, was not a search at all, but a voluntary and consensual 
production by appellant of contraband on his person, after the officer suggested to him that he 
would be better off cooperating. As the trial court in the present case found, the search of Mr. 
Voss' car was not consensual. Martens is therefore inapplicable in the present case, and does not 
relieve an Idaho police officer of his duty to obtain probable cause before searching a car, even a 
student's car on a school campus. 
CONCLUSION 
The out-of-jurisdiction authorities the state produces in support of its proposition that 
Off. Ted Arnold of the Boise City Police Department did not need probable cause to search 
Joseph Voss' car are inapposite to the present case, and are therefore of no persuasive value. 
The search of Joseph Voss' car in the instant case is incurably and irretrievably tainted by the 
fact that a police officer conducted the search without probable cause. The fruits of this search 
should therefore have been suppressed, and the trial court's order denying Mr. Voss' motion to 
suppress should be reversed. 
DATED, thisSay of June, 2010. 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-MD-2009-7676 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This case is before the Court on Defendant Joseph A. Voss, Jr's (Voss's) appeal of the 
magistrate Hon. Michael J. Oths's decision denying Voss's motion to suppress. For the reasons that 
follow, the decision of the magistrate will be affirmed. 
FACTS 
The facts in this case are essentially undisputed. 1 On April 8, 2009, Voss was a student at 
Timberline High School in Boise. He was eighteen years old. Voss drove his car to school that day. 
Another driver called the school to complain about the way Voss was driving on school property. 
David Roberts, the Timberline assistant principal, called Voss to his office to talk about the driving 
complaint. While he was talking to Voss, Roberts detected the odor of cigarette smoke on Voss. 
Timberline has a strict prohibition against students using or possessing tobacco products on campus. 
1These facts are taken from the magistrate's findings of fact. 


























A violation of this policy subjects a student to discipline. Since Voss was eighteen, it was not 
unlawful for him to possess or use tobacco products. During their conversation, Voss did not admit 
that he possessed or used tobacco on campus, although Roberts suspected that he did have tobacco 
either on his person or in his car. 
Ted Arnold, a member of the Boise Police Department, was assigned to Timberline as a 
school resource officer. Roberts decided to search Voss's vehicle without consulting Officer Arnold, 
but he did ask Arnold and another school official to help him search the vehicle. Roberts testified 
that he clearly told Yoss he would be searching his car, with or without his consent. However, he 
did request his consent and, in response, Yoss opened his car door for the school officials and 
Officer Arnold. Roberts and Officer Arnold both searched Voss's vehicle and found drug 
paraphernalia and a concealed weapon. 
Voss was charged with possession of paraphernalia and carrying a concealed weapon 
without a license. He filed a motion to suppress, which was denied. Arter the denial or the motion 
to suppress, Voss entered a guilty plea to these charges, under the condition that he could appeal the 
magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress to the district court. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge, the district judge is acting 
as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 
(1992). The interpretation of law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free 
review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). The trial court's 
determinations of fact are upheld if supported by "substantial evidence," or "unless clearly 























erroneous." State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996), State v. 
Peters, 130 Idaho 960, 961, 950 P.2d 1299 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The district court may not substitute its view for that of the magistrate as to credibility of 
witnesses, weight to be given to testimony, and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. 
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991). The reason for this is 
that the trial court, unlike a reviewing court, was physically present for testimony and presentation 
of evidence. As such, the trial court makes its findings based on many observations that a court 
reviewing a cold transcript is unable to grasp, such as the demeanor and physical manifestations of a 
witness. 
The district court is required to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the magistrate's findings of fact. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 
1988). If those findings are so supported, and if the conclusions of law demonstrate proper 
application of legal principles to the facts found, then the district court will affirm the magistrate's 
judgment. Id. Substantial evidence is, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Clear Springs 
Foods, Inc. v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 136 Idaho 761, 764, 40 P.3d 119 (2002), quoting, Evans v. 
Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473,478, 849 P.2d 934 (1993). 
ANALYSIS 
22 Voss contends that the magistrate erred in finding that the assistant principal's search of 
23 Voss's car was reasonable in all the circumstances and in holding that the same relaxed standard of 
24 (reasonable) suspicion applied to the police officer who helped conduct the search of the car as it 
25 



























did to the assistant principal, so that the police officer could assist in the search without probable 
cause. 
In his decision, the magistrate found that "[t]he analysis of this motion is the same, whether 
the search was conducted only by the assistant principal, or with the active assistance of the police 
officer." After noting that there was no published Idaho case addressing the issue, the magistrate 
concluded that the search was justified at its inception and that it was reasonable in its scope. 
Consequently, the magistrate denied Voss's motion to suppress. 
Both parties agree that the seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases applicable here are New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) and Safford Unified School District 
#1 v. Redding, _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009). However, neither of these 
cases addressed this particular circumstance: a search conducted by a school official with the 
assistance of a police officer. The parties agree that there are no published Idaho cases addressing 
this issue and both parties, as would be expected, have cited those cases from other jurisdictions 
which support their respective positions. 
In T.L. 0. the Supreme Court stated: 
We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the 
accommodations of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial needs of 
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require 
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that 
the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search 
of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the 
search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one 
must consider whether the search, as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' Under ordinary 
circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be 'justified at 
its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will tum up 
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. 
Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably 
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and 
sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. 105 S.Ct. at 742-43. 























In T.L.O.. the search was conducted by a school official. The Com1 cautioned ''lwJe here 
consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. 
This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of 
searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement 
agencies, we express no opinion on that question." Id., at 743 n.7. 
In Safford, the Supreme Court revisited the school search issue. There the court found that a 
strip search of a student by school officials looking for over-the-counter pain relievers was not 
reasonable in its scope and, therefore, was unconstitutional. The court noted that "[p]erhaps the best 
that can be said generally about the required knowledge component of probable cause for a law 
enforcement officer's evidence is that it raise a 'fair probability,' or a 'substantial chance,' of 
discovering evidence of criminal activity. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be 
described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing." 129 S.Ct. at 2639 (internal 
citation omitted). 
As previously noted, there is no published Idaho case concerning whether the standard is 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, when a warrantless search is conducted by a school official 
assisted by a police officer, and there is no U.S. Supreme Court case directly on point. There are a 
few published cases from other jurisdictions, but they are split in their results. 
For instance, in State v. K.L.M., 278 Ga.App. 219,628 S.E.2d 651 (2006), the Georgia Court 
of Appeals reviewed a case where a law enforcement officer searched a student at school, at the 
direction of the school's principal. The court, relying on precedent from the Georgia Supreme Court 
22 
(State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488,216 S.E.2d 586 (1975)), concluded that "since the actual search of the 
23 
juvenile was done by a police officer and not a school official, the police officer was required to 
24 
25 



























have probable cause prior to his search of the juvenile." 268 S.E.2d at 652. The court concluded that 
"the search in this case is not subject to the minimal restraint analysis applied to school officials, 
even though there is no dispute that Johnson [the police officer] was present for the safety of school 
personnel and performed the search only after he was directed to do so by the school principal. 
Because Johnson was a law enforcement officer who participated in the search, probable cause was 
required." Id., at 653. 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals had a different view In the Matter of D.D., 146 
N.C.App. 309, 554 S.E.2d 346 (2001). In that case, school resource officers were involved in a 
search initiated by the school principal. The Court of Appeals noted that: 
Generally, school search cases fall into three categories. First, courts apply the T.L.O. 
reasonableness standard to those cases where a school official initiates the searches on his 
own or law enforcement involvement is minimal. Courts characterize these cases as ones in 
which the police officers act 'in conjunction with' the school official. More recently, the 
T.L. 0. standard has also been applied to cases where a school resource officer conducts a 
search, based upon his own investigation or at the direction of another school official, in the 
furtherance of well-established educational and safety goals. Generally, cases applying the 
T.L. 0. standard to searches conducted pursuant to the school police officer's own 
investigation, do so where the officer 'is employed by a school district,' and is 'ultimately 
responsible to the school district,' rather than the local police department. Courts draw a 
clear distinction between the aforementioned cases and those in which outside law 
enforcement officers search students as part of an independent investigation or in which 
school official search students at the request or behest of the outside law enforcement 
officers and law enforcement agencies. Courts do not apply T.L.0. to these cases but instead 
require the traditional probable cause requirement to justify the search. The purpose of the 
search conducted by so-called 'outside' police officers is not to maintain discipline, order, or 
student safety, but to obtain evidence of a crime. 554 S.E.2d at 352-53 (citations omitted). 
This Court finds the reasoning of the North Carolina Court of Appeals to be persuasive and 
adopts its reasoning that whether the school student search standard is reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause depends on who initiated the investigation and what the purpose of the investigation 



























was when police officers are involved ("in conjunction with" searches). As the D.D. Court went on 
to say: 
The application of T.L.O. in situations where law enforcement acts in conjunction with 
school officials in based on the premise that '[a] police investigation that includes the search 
of a public school student, when the search is initiated by police and conducted by police, 
usually lacks the 'commonality of interests' existing between teachers and students. But 
when school officials, who are responsible for the welfare and education of the students 
within the campus, initiate an investigation and conduct it on school grounds in conjunction 
with police, the school has brought the police into the school-student relationship.' When 
school officials bring police officers into the school setting, officers are to assist 'the school 
administration in creating and sustaining a safe environment to learning.' As noted supra, 
school officials' duty to protect 'students and their teachers from behavior that threatens 
their safety,' has become a difficult task '[w]ith the growing incidence of violence and 
dangerous weapons in school.· lt could be hazardous to discourage school officials from 
requesting the assistance of available trained police [officers], as teachers and other school 
officials are 'generally ... untrained in proper pat down procedures or in neutralizing 
dangerous weapons.' We are persuaded by the aforementioned reasoning that the T.L.O. 
standard should apply in this ju1isdiction where the officers act 'in conjunction with' school 
officials. 554 S.E.2d at 353 (citations omitted). 
The key factor in an "in conjunction with" search is who initiated the investigation and what 
the purpose of the investigation was. If the investigation was initiated by the police and it was being 
pursued for the purpose of determining whether criminal misconduct had occurred, the probable 
cause standard should be applicable. Where, as here, the investigation was prompted by school 
officials for the purpose of determining whether school policies or rules had been violated, the 
reasonable suspicion standard applies, even where police officers are involved in the search and 
particularly where school resource police officers are involved. 
Here, there is no dispute that the investigation was initiated by a school official for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether Voss violated a school tobacco policy. There was clearly reasonable 
suspicion to search Voss's car, since he smelled of cigarette smoke and he had just been in his car. 
In other words, the search of the car was justified by the school policy and was reasonable in its 
26 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 7 
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1 scope. The fact that a school resource officer participated in the search does not change the 

























Because the magistrate's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and he 
committed no legal error, the decision of the magistrate is hereby affirmed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR MD 2009-7676 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
and 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
I, Joseph A. Voss, Jr., appearing on my own behalf: respectfully request that this 
court reconsider the decision entered in this case and filed on November 2, 2010. In 
support thereof: 1 submit the following: 
The court on appeal observed that there was "clearly reasonable suspicion to 
search Voss's car since he smelled of cigarettes and had just been to his car." 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 7) The court concluded that this meant that Voss might have 
violated school policy by having cigarettes in his car, and therefore, the search met the 
test of "reasonable under all the circumstances, as required by the TR. 0. case relied 
Motion for Reconsideration Page 1 
000100
upon by the court. The court on appeal missed a crucial distinction in the law, and that 
makes the search not reasonable under the circumstances. 
I understand the rule against underage students possessing cigarettes, smoking 
anywhere around the school or campus, and having cigarettes in their vehicles. For an 
underage student, mere possession of cigarettes would be a violation of law, and the 
cigarettes in vehicles would constitute contraband. Possession of cigarettes would not 
only violate school policy, but would violate the law. Detection of recent smoking on a 
student could be reasonable suspicion that the contraband might be in their car under such 
circumstances. 
However, in this case, I was 18 at the time. I was legally entitled to purchase and 
smoke cigarettes, and to possess cigarettes on my person and in my vehicle, as long as I 
did not do so within the school. While the odor of smoke on my person would indicate 
that at some time in the past I had smoked, such would be inconclusive of how recently -
and particularly, whether 1 had been smoking in my car while on school property. 
Without more, it is equally likely that the conduct occurred well away from the school, 
which would be perfectly legal and not involve school policy at all. Robert's "reasonable 
suspicion" that I had smoked recently and had cigarettes in his car was in fact pure 
1 . I specu at10n. 
In my case, possession of cigarettes was not a violation of law. Possession of 
cigarettes in vehicles was not contraband, and was not illegal. Other adults - teachers, 
custodial staff, administrative staff and others - were and are not prohibited from keeping 
1 Roberts testified to the court below that one of the reasons he decided to search my car was because ofa 
prior confrontation regarding smoking- which was before I turned 18. The school district rules prohibit 
school officials from relying upon previous circumstances in the determination to conduct a search. 
According to school district rules, justification for a search at inception must come from the circumstances 
at hand, without reference to the student's record or previous difficulties. 
Motion for Reconsideration Page 2 
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cigarettes in their cars, for example, although they are not permitted to smoke in the 
building. 
The State concedes that Roberts had no cause to institute a search of my vehicle 
other than the smell of tobacco on my person. The police officer had no probable cause of 
any kind. I submit that, as a matter of law, the policy pertaining to possession of 
cigarettes in a vehicle by an adult student, where such does not apply to any other adults 
connected with the school, is arbitrary and unreasonable. I was not smoking in the 
building, and had no cigarettes on my person within the building. I was in full 
compliance with school policy at the time of the confrontation with Mr. Roberts, and that 
should have been the end of it. Because I was an adult and my possession of cigarettes in 
my car was in all other respects legal, and because the rule against cigarettes in a car is 
reasonably addressed to underage students, the application of this rule against me is 
arbitrary and unreasonable. The search the vehicle for cigarettes was therefore, 
unreasonable. 
The defense would submit this issue on this motion and memorandum; further 
oral argument is not required. 
Respectfully submitted this .1t'day of November, 2010. 
~~~ Jseh A. Voss, fr 
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Certificate of Service 
I served a copy of the foregoing document by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to: 
Boise City Prosecuting Attorney 
Boise City Hall 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Ada County Public Defender 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 E. Front St 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Dated November_, 2010. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CR-MD-090007676 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR RECONSDERA TION 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., 
Defendant. 
This case came before the Court on Defendant/ Appellant Joseph A. Voss, Jr.' s (Voss's) 
motion for reconsideration. The Court has reviewed the motion and supporting memorandum and 
finds that no further briefing or argument is necessary. For the reasons that follow, the motion will 
be denied. 
The relevant facts are set forth in the magistrate's order and this Court's opm10n of 
November 2, 2010. In his motion for reconsideration, Voss argues that the Boise School District's 
policy prohibiting use or possession of tobacco by students on campus applies only to underage 
students, and/or that the policy applies only to such activities within the school. In other words, 
Voss asserts that since he was 18 years old at the time, he could possess cigarettes in his vehicle on 
school grounds, and therefore there was no probable cause for the search of his car. However, the 
uncontroverted testimony at trial was that the tobacco policy applied to all students, including those 
who are 18. 



























Finally, Voss appears to argue that the tobacco policy applicable to students who are 18 is 
arbitrary because there is no similar policy for other adults such as teachers, custodial staff and 
administrative staff. This argument was not raised before the magistrate or on appeal and will not 
be considered on motion to reconsider on appeal. Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497,211 P3d 281 
(2009). 
Based on the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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STA TE OF IDAHO, 
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vs. 











No. CR MD 2009 7676 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Joseph A. Voss hereby files his Notice of Appeal. Mr. Voss appeals his guilty 
convictions, entered conditionally on January 4, 2010 after the Court denied his motion to 
suppress evidence by Order dated September 16, 2009, and also appeals from the Memorandum 
Decision and Order entered by the Court on November 2,2010. 
As required by I.A.R. 17, Mr. Voss states: 
l. Statement of Issues on Appeal: The issues on appeal include but are not limited to: 
A. Did the District Court err in affirming the decision of the trial court denying Mr. 
Voss' motion to suppress evidence? 
2. Jurisdictional Statement. This Court has jurisdiction under I.A.R. 11 ( c )( 1 ). 
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3. Transcript. A transcript of the proceedings has already been prepared and the same 
can be used for this current appeal. 
4. Record. In addition to those documents automatically included pursuant to I.A.R. 
28(a)(2), Appellant requests that all material relating to the Defendant's case, including the 
Defendant's entire District Court file, be made part of the record. 
Counsel hereby certifies that: 
1. A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the court reporter. 
2. That the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
3. That there is no filing fee for this appeal because it is a criminal matter. 
4. That this notice has been served by mail to all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
,3-11 
Dated this /.. / day of December, 2010. 
ohn Meienhofer 
ttomey for Joseph Voss 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this(.~ day of December, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, via U.S. mail, to the following persons: 
Boise City Attorney 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Susan Gambee 
Court Reporter 
Tucker and Associates 
PO Box 1625 
Boise, ID 83701-1625 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 38366 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing Held January 4,2010, Boise, Idaho, filed 
March 2, 2010. 
2. Transcript of Hearing Held September 9, 2009, Boise, Idaho, filed March 9, 2010. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 7th day of February, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
B~, DeputyClerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38366 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
JOHN MEIENHOFER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: FEB O 7 2011 --------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 38366 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
JOSEPH A. VOSS, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
13th day of December, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
~~~~' 
